Samuel Huntington, the cause is a struggle for resources (xii). Oil as special resource: 2001 and since revelatory of the consequences of oil dependency (xiii-xv). Goal of book: Tracing the evolution of U.S. oil policy and weighing its consequences for the future (xvi). Ch. 1: The Dependency Dilemma: Imported Oil and National Security. Cento (1-4). Military sees it as an extension of the 1980 Carter Doctrine (5-6).Similar development elsewhere of military as global oil-protection service (6-7). Oil asked to U.S. economic and military strength (7-10). Oil makes this country strong; dependency makes us weak (11). U.S. policy has been to securitize oil (12).Dependency on imported oil surpassed 50%in April 1998 (13). Late 1990s policy debate (14). George W. Bush acknowledges problem but does not really counter dependency with policies (15). Dependency is not a static condition. (15) Forecasts of growing dependency through 2025 (17-18). Table of proven reserves (19). Reserves in volatile regions (18, 20-21). U.S. presence in these regions and the nature of the oil industry are inherently destabilizing (21-22).
Competition (or demand) for oil is increasing (22-23).Result: global economic instability (23).Ineffectiveness of military strategy, which has serious unintended consequences (24-26). Ch. 2: Lethal Embrace: The American Alliance with Saudi Arabia. Importance of U.S.-Saudi relationship (26-27). Anxiety about oil supplies in early 1940s led to decision in favor of substantial and orderly expansion of production in Eastern Hemisphere sources of supply, principally the Middle East (April 1944, Foreign Petroleum Policy of the United States) (28-30). SOCAL creates CASOC and finds oil, 1938 (31).Recognition of importance leads Roosevelt to extend Lend-Lease to Saudi Arabia, 1943(32-33). U.S. govt. tries to set up the Petroleum Reserves Corp. to buy CASOCsconcession, 1943 • but resistance keeps it from being realized (34-35). A public-private partnership (David Painter, Oil and the American Century
) characterizesU.S. Involvement in development of Persian Gulf oil (35). Roosevelt and In Saud forge alliance, Feb. 14, 1945 (35-37). U.S.commitment to defend Saudi oil fields and the Saudi government • and other Persian Gulf oil sources • a major theme of cold-war history (37-38). Iran crisis of 1946 and concern for Mideast oil: need to overcome domestic resistance to overseas commitments led to apocalyptic terms of the Truman Doctrine (39-41). U.S. helps create modern Saudi army and air force, 1949-early 1950s (40). Eisenhower Doctrine (Jan. 5, 1957) designed to bolster pro-American regimes in the context of Nassers flirtation with the Soviet Union (41-42).Vietnam War forced proxy-based Nixon Doctrine (July 1969); Saudi Arabia and Iran are proxies of choice (42-43). But it inspired domestic opposition and leads to Shahs overthrow in 1979 (44-45). Hostage drama and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan lead to Carter Doctrine (Jan. 23, 1980): the U.S. will protect Persian Gulf oil by any means necessary (45-46).
Creation of Central Command (46-47). Consequences of the Carter Doctrine: huge arms sales to Saudi Arabia (47-48), tilting toward Iraq in Iran-Iraq war (48-49), ousting Iraq from Kuwait (49-50). Aug. 6, 1990 Cheney-King Fahd meeting leads to Operation Desert Shield (51-52).Desert Storm (52-53). Containment of Iraq: No-fly zones, $40b in arms to Saudi Arabia (53). 9/11 attacks and Osama bin Ladens hostility provoked primarily by the deployment of American troops in Saudi Arabia and the continuing alliance between Washington and the Saudi royal family, which was a product of Americas thirst for imported oil and the monarchys hunger for protection (54-55). Ch. 3: Choosing Dependency: The Energy Strategy of the Bush Administration. Bush administrations May
National Energy Policy
(The Cheney report) (Feigns commitment to energy independence (56-59). But Ch. 8reveals immensity of growing dependency on imported oil in a chart and calls on the president to make our energy security apriority in our trade and foreign policy (61-64). Hopes for source diversification (Latin
America, Caspian Basin, and West Africa) face high risk of supply disruptions and shutdowns (64-66).
Defense Planning Guidance
of 1992 and the Project for a New American Century highlight military (67-69).George W. Bushs Sept. 24, 1999 Citadel speech called for greater power-projection capabilities (69-70). A Feb. 3, 2001 secrets document aims at assessing military implications of the energy plan (70-71). These 30, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasizes power projection (71-72). Warn terror morphing into energy supplyprotection: It appears that theadministration has merged its three mainforeign-policy and security policies(increased access to overseas oil, enhancedpower-projection capabilities, and intensifiedanti-terror operations) into a single, unified plan (72-73). Ch. 4: Trapped in the Gulf: TheIrresistible Lure of Bountiful Petroleum. The Cheney report committed the UnitedStates to perpetual dependence on PersianGulf oil (74-78). U.S. strategy aims atraising Persian Gulf oil production from 24.0million barrels per day in 1999 to 44.5 millionbarrels in 2020 (79).
Obstacles: economic,technological, political, and military (79-82).Strands of U.S. policy constitute a strategyof maximum extraction (82-84). Primaryimportance of Saudi Arabia led some toadvocate in 2002 for seizure of Saudi oilfields (84-86). Social, economic, political,and religious sources of Saudi instability (86-89). U.S. approach is to strengthen Saudiroyal family and encourage reform (89-90).Iraq war as a way of being able to withdrawU.S. troops from Saudi Arabia (90).Palestinian statehood also backed for thisreason (91). Likewise. calls for reform andfighting terrorism in Saudi Arabia (91-93).Overthrow of Saddam Hussein needed bothto foster Gulf stability and to boost Iraqiproduction (94-105). Irans policies are inopposition to U.S. plans in the Persian Gulf,and sanctions are an inadequate weaponbecause they impede development of petroleum resources (105-07). Iran also hasthe power to disrupt energy supplies byblocking the Strait of Hormuz (107-08).
Forthe time being the dual-track policy of Zalmay Khalilzad, consisting of denouncingIrans government while encouragingopponents of the regime is being followed,but more aggressive policies are beingconsidered (108-10). Gulf problems willcontinue to require U.S. troops: No matterhow costly the effort grows, we cannotremove our forces from the Gulf as long aswe remain committed to a strategy of maximum petroleum extraction. To meetanticipated U.S. energy demand in the yearsahead while also slaking the thirst of otheroil-importing nations, the Gulf producersmust . . . boost their combined oil output by85 percent between now and 2020, andthese supplies must safely reach theirmarkets (111-12). Ch. 5: No Safe Havens: Oil and Conflictbeyond the Persian Gulf.